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STATE IMMUNITY FROM THE DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE: EXTENSION OF THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT
DOCTRINE FROM STATE PURCHASE AND SALE OF
GOODS AND SERVICES TO NATURAL RESOURCES
In contexts other than natural resources, the United States Supreme
Court has upheld the state's preferential sale of state-owned resources to
state residents.' As well, the Court has upheld the state's preferential
purchase of goods and services from state residents.2 In these cases, the
Court has acknowledged that the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution3 does not restrain the states from acting as a "market participant." 4 While not conclusive, case law indicates that the Court will
extend the "market participant" immunity to instances in which the state
is distributing state-owned natural resources to state citizens. The state,
however, in making such distribution must be the immediate owner of
the resources 6 and must in fact be acting as a market participant and not
as a market regulator.7 Finally, even if the state fulfills these two elements,
the state can only control its distribution of the resource so long as the
state does not monopolize the resource. 8
In Reeves v. Stake,9 in upholding a South Dakota policy preferring
residents over nonresidents in the sale of state-manufactured cement,' 0
the United States Supreme Court first suggested a difference between
state-manufactured goods and natural raw resources with regard to the
Court's application of the market-participant doctrine." The Court re1. See, e.g., Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
2. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Cf. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (the state required more extensive
documentation from car processing plants not located in the state).
3. U.S. Const. art. I, S. 8, cl. 3.
4. See, e.g., White, 460 U.S. 204; Reeves, 447 U.S. 419; Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794.
104 S. Ct. 2237
U.S. -,
5. See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, (1984). For a discussion of Wunnicke and the extension of the market-participant doctrine to natural
resources, see supra notes 244-311 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237. Cf. New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455
U.S. 331 (1982) (the Court found that a private company's sale of electric energy was distinct from
state ownership of the waters used to create the energy and, thus, did not come within the marketparticipant doctrine). For a discussion of state ownership of natural resources, see supra notes 298311 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237. For a discussion of the state as a market regulator, see
supra notes 176-220 and accompanying text.
U.S. -. , 105 S. Ct.
8. See Western Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Cory, 726 F.2d 1340, aff'd mem., 1859 (1985).
9. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
10. See id. at 446-47.
11. See id. at 443.
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jected the nonresident petitioner's contention that the Commerce Clause
should bar South Dakota from limiting the sale of state-owned cement
to state residents.12 Cement, decried the Court, is not a natural resource,
like coal, timber, wild game, or minerals. 3 South Dakota had not sought
to limit access to the state's limestone.' 4 Instead, South Dakota had
preferentially distributed state-produced cement, the "end product of a
complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on
raw materials."' 5
In South-Central Timber Devlopment, Inc. v. Wunnicke, 6 the Court
again suggested a difference between state-manufactured goods and natural resources with regard to the Court's application of the market-participant doctrine."7 The Court held that the Commerce Clause barred the
state from requiring in-state processing of timber severed from state land
and sold to timber companies.'" In distinguishing the result in Wunnicke
from the result in Reeves, the Court noted that Wunnicke involved three
elements not present in Reeves-foreign commerce, restrictions on resale,
and a natural resource."
If the Court concludes, as suggested in Reeves, that the state can never
give preferences with respect to natural resources, then the Court's application of the Commerce Clause will threaten the states' role as trustee
for state resources and haunt states seeking preservation and control of
the states' natural resources. No case has directly.addressed whether the
state can preserve its natural resources by distributing the resources preferentially to state residents. The resounding question still lies poised,
unanswered in the wake of Reeves and four years of subsequent United
States Supreme Court cases:2" if Congress has failed to enact legislation
governing the distribution of natural resources, can a state assert domestic,
protective control over the state's natural resources if the state acts as a
market participant?
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
The Commerce Clause2' allocates power to the federal government to
regulate interstate commerce. The United States Supreme Court has re12. See id..
13. Id.
14. Id.at 444.
15. Id.
16. - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
17. 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
18. Id. at 2247.
19. Id. at 2245.
20. See, e.g., Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237; Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
21. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, &l.3.
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peatedly stated that Congress' power to enact legislation concerning commerce extends not only to the use of channels of interstate commerce or
to the protection of persons and things in commerce, but also to activities
affecting commerce. 22 If a state statute conflicts with a federal statute
concerning interstate commerce, then the federal statute can preempt the
state statute.23
Moreover, the Supreme Court extended this concept of plenary power
even to instances in which Congress had not enacted legislation but had
the power to enact such legislation under the Commerce Clause ("the
dormant Commerce Clause"). 24 The Court in Pike v. Bruce Church,Inc.'s
developed a dormant Commerce Clause test26 ("the Pike test") to determine the validity of a state law.
Where no applicable federal statute exists, the federal power over
interstate commerce allows a state to burden interstate commerce if
1) the state statute on its face treats residents and nonresidents equally;
2) the statute's effect on interstate commerce is only incidental, as opposed
to the goal of the statute; and 3) the burden on interstate commerce does
not exceed local benefits.2' According to the Supreme Court," [t]he extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature
be promoted as
of the local interest involved, and on whether it could
28
activities."
interstate
on
impact
lesser
a
well with
Facially discriminatory legislation, legislation which expressly prefers
state goods over interstate goods 29 or intrastate sale of the goods over
exportation, is not likely to survive a Pike test inquiry.3 ' When the state
legislation operates as an explicit barrier to commerce between two states,
the Court strictly scrutinizes the statute: 32 the state must demonstrate a
close fit between the statute and the statute's asserted local purpose as
well as fulfill the remaining elements of the Pike test.3 3 In reviewing
facially discriminatory legislation or policies, the Court is unlikely to find
that a state objective justifies a means that interferes with the free flow
of commerce.34 However, the Court has refused to apply the Pike test
22. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
23. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
24. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
25. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
26. See id. at 142.
27. See id.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622 (1978).
30. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
31. Tarlock, National Power, State Resource Sovereignty and Federalism in the 1980's: Scaling
America's Magic Mountain, 32 U. KAN. L. REV. 111, 128 (1983).
32. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957 (1982).
33. Id.
34. Tarlock, supra note 31, at 128.
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when the state buys or sells in the private marketplace. 5 Even when the
state discriminates between residents and nonresidents, the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply and the state can preferentially sell statemanufactured goods to state residents3 6 and can preferentially purchase
goods and services from state residents.37
On three occasions, the United States Supreme Court has upheld the
constitutionality of a state's preferential distribution of state resources to
state residents. First, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,38 the Court
upheld a Maryland statute that facially discriminated against nonresidents.
To reach environmental goals, the Maryland statute provided that anyone
in possession of an inoperable automobile over eight years old could
transfer it to a scrap processor who could then claim a "bounty" from
the state for the destruction of the automobile. 39 However, Maryland
required more extensive documentation of the automobile title from processing plants not located in Maryland.'
The nonresident plaintiff argued that the distinction burdened commerce
and denied him equal protection. 4 The Court responded that Maryland's
action was not the kind of action with which the Commerce Clause was
concerned: no trade barrier prevented the flow of abandoned cars in the
interstate market.42 Moreover, nothing in the purposes of the Commerce
Clause prohibited a state, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and from preferring the state's own citizens.43
Subsequent to Alexandria Scrap, in Reeves v. Stake, 4' the Supreme
Court upheld the preferential sale of South Dakota's government-produced cement. In Reeves, South Dakota built a cement plant in response
to a regional cement shortage and sold the cement to residents. When
the plant produced more cement than residents could use, the state exported the cement.' 6 Faced with a second cement shortage, the state again
first supplied the cement to residents and then to out-of-state buyers.47 In
upholding South Dakota's preferential policy, the Court reasoned that
35. This definition of market participant gives a shorthand description of the Supreme Court's
view of market participant although the Supreme Court has not clearly defined the marketparticipant
test. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
37. See, e.g., White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
38. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
39. Id. at 796-97.
40. Id. at 800-01.
41. Id. at 802.
42. Id. at 806, 809-10.
43. Id. at 810.
44. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
45. Id. at 431-32.
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id.
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South Dakota fit the market-participant classification by acting as a private
citizen in buying or selling a product.4 8 The Court also reasoned that the
purpose of the state government was to serve the citizens of the state.4 9
Therefore, the state could limit benefits generated by a state program to
those who funded the state's treasury.5"
Likewise, in White v. Massachusetts Council of ConstructionEmployers,5" the Court held that with respect to state dollars, a local government
can require contractors completing city-funded construction projects to
employ city residents. 2 In White, the Mayor of Boston issued an order
requiring all contractors completing construction projects, partially financed by the city, to employ a work force of at least half city residents
on the project. 3 The Court decided that, insofar as the city expended its
own funds in entering into construction contracts, the city was a market
participant and immune from Commerce Clause scrutiny. 4
THE STATE AS A MARKET REGULATOR OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Given the focus on goods and services, neither Alexandria Scrap,
Reeves, nor White resolve the issue of when the state can preferentially
distribute natural resources to state citizens without violating the dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court has, in fact, avoided directly answering
whether the state can ever act as a market participant in the distribution
of natural resources owned by the state. Instead, in three natural resources
cases, Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,5" New England Power Co.
v. New Hampshire,56 and South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v.
Wunnicke,57 the Court found that the states impermissibly imposed restrictions on natural resources because the resources were, at the time of
restriction, owned by a private party rather than by the state. 8 In Sporhase, because the state did not allege that it was acting as a market
participant, the Court did not explicitly address the market-participant
issues, but automatically applied the traditional Pike test.5 9 In New England Power Co. and in Wunnicke,the Court reasoned that the states'
48. See id. at 439-40.
49. See id. at 441-42.
50. Id. at 442.
51. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
52. Id. at 206.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 215.
55. 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
56. 455 U.S. 331 (1982).
57. -. U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
58. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951; New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6; Wunnicke,
104 S. Ct. at 2245-46 & n.9.
59. See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 954.
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restrictions operated in contexts too far removed from the nexus of state
ownership to allow the state to freely control as a market participant.'
In each case, the Court applied the Pike test and invalidated the restrictions. 6
In Sporhase, the Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause invalidated a Nebraska statute restricting interstate transfer of Nebraska's
water.62 In Sporhase, the defendant owned continguous tracts of land in
Nebraska and Colorado. 63 A well physically located on the Nebraska tract
pumped groundwater which irrigated both the Nebraska tract and Colorado tract.' 4 Nebraska sued to enjoin the well-owner from transporting
water to Colorado without a permit required by a Nebraska statute.65
The statute, relied on by Nebraska, required any person, intending to
withdraw groundwater from any well located in Nebraska and intending
to transport the water for use in an adjoining state, to obtain a permit
from the Nebraska Department of Water Resources. 6 6 Further, the statute
provided that the Director of Water Resources could only approve the
permit if the withdrawal of water was reasonable, not contrary to the
conservation and use of groundwater, and not otherwise detrimental to
the public welfare.67 Finally, the statute required that the state, in which
the water was to be used, must grant reciprocal rights to withdraw and
transport water to Nebraska.'
In Sporhase, Nebraska, while not explicitly claiming status as a market
participant, alleged that the state "owned" all of Nebraska's underground
water and could therefore restrict the interstate transfer of the water.69
Despite such an allegation, the Court noted that Nebraska did not own
the water already reduced to private ownership by private individuals.7"
Although Nebraska's interest in regulating the water for its citizens may
have been relevant to the Commerce Clause analysis, Nebraska's interest
did not absolutely remove Nebraska groundwater from such scrutiny.7
Under the Pike test, the Court found a strong local interest in conserving
the water.72 The Court also found that Nebraska placed similar intrastate
limitations on the intrastate transfer of water within certain sections of
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

See New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6; Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244-46.
See New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338-39; Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2247.
See Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 960.
Id. at 944.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 951.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 955-56.
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Nebraska.73 Such limitations, according to the Court, suggested even4
handedness in regulating interstate and intrastate transfers of water.'
However, the reciprocity provision operated as an explicit barrier to commerce between the two states.75 Therefore, the state bore the burden of
demonstrating a close fit between the reciprocity requirement and the
local purpose of conserving water.76
The Court held that the reciprocity requirement did not serve conservation goals and violated the dormant Commerce Clause.77 Under the
statute, Nebraska, without restriction, could refuse to transfer water if
the state in which the water was to be used did not give Nebraska reciprocal access to water.78 Nebraska could invoke the reciprocity clause and
refuse to transfer water even if the Director of Water Resources found
that such transfer was not contrary to conservation.79
Subsequent to Sporhase, in New England Power Co., the Court held
that a market-participant classification did not allow the state to restrict
the sale of electric energy by a private company which utilized state
waters in producing electricity.8" In New England Power Co., the New
Hampshire Public Utilities Commission prohibited the New England Power
Company from exporting hydroelectric energy generated from state waters.8
The Commission was acting pursuant to a state statute empowering the
Commission to prohibit the exportation of such electrical energy when
the Commission determined that the energy was "reasonably required for
use within this state and that the public good require[d] that it be delivered
for such use." 82
Like Nebraska's claim of ownership of the underground waters in
Sporhase, New Hampshire argued that it owned the Connecticut River,
83
the source of New England Power Company's hydroelectric power.
However, going further than Nebraska, New Hampshire expressly relied
on the market-participant doctrine of Reeves.84 In reply to the marketparticipant allegation, the Court found that "New Hampshire ha[d] done
more than regulate use of the resource it assertedly own[ed]; it ha[d]
restricted the sale of electric energy, a product entirely distinct from the
river waters used to produce it.""
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id.
Id. at 956.
Id. at 957.
Id.
See id. at 957-58.
Id. at 958.
See id. at 944, 957-58.
See New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6.
Id. at 335.
Id.
See id. at 338 n.6.
See id.
Id.
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Finally, in Wunnicke, in a plurality opinion, the Court held that the
state could not require in-state processing of timber severed from state
land and sold to timber companies.8 6 Pursuant to an Alaska statute, the
Alaska Department of Natural Resources required that the successful
bidder for state lumber on state lands must partially process the timber,
by either cutting the width to approximately twelve inches or by squaring
the timber, prior to shipping the lumber outside of Alaska. 7 In turn, the
state was selling the logs at a reduced price.8 8 Alaska contended that it
was a market participant in the processed-timber market, although Alaska
did not participate in the actual processing but only in the sale of timber.9
The Court, however, found that the state could not restrain use of the
product after sale.' The state had sold the timber, had allowed the timber
to be severed from state lands, and therefore, could not impose in-state
processing restraints.9"
In Sporhase, New England Power Co., and Wunnicke, the Court was
able to avoid answering whether the state could ever act as a market
participant in the distribution of state-owned natural resources and preferentially distribute the resources to state citizens. In Sporhase, the Court
found that the state was not the owner of the water which the state was
trying to regulate.92 In New England Power Co., the state was trying to
govern privately-owned electric power, not the river itself.93 Finally, in
Wunnicke, the Court found that the state was exceeding its power to
structure its own business relations and was restricting the "private,
separate economic relationships of [the state's] trading partners" 94 by
trying to control the timber even after the state had sold the timber to
private individuals.
THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT TEST
Predicting the Supreme Court's extension of the market-participant
doctrine to the distribution of state-owned natural resources is difficult
because the Supreme Court has far from clearly delineated the marketparticipant test even in the area of state-manufactured goods. Sufficient
dicta exists in the Supreme Court decisions to support several characterizations of the doctrine. Arguably, two factors activate the market-par86. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2247.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2239.
Id.
Id. at 2244.
See id. at 2245-46.
See id. at 2245-46 & n.9.
Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951.
New EnglandPower Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244.
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ticipant doctrine: 1) when the state becomes a private actor, 95 and 2) when
the state acts pursuant to its inherent sovereignty. 96 According to the
market-participant cases, when the state acts as a private businessman,
then the courts should treat the state as a private businessman and allow
the state to give preferences to those who purchase from the state or sell
to the state97 (the "private-actor analogy"). In addition, the Court has
noted that expenditure of state resources preferentially to citizens of the
state is a fundamental aspect of state sovereignty and that the Commerce
Clause should not preclude such preferential distribution98 ("the sovereignty view").
A. The Private-ActorAnalogy
The United States Supreme Court has avoided Commerce Clause analysis by treating the state as a private businessman. 99 In Alexandria Scrap,
Reeves, and White, the Court noted that "the Commerce Clause responds
principally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private
trade in the national marketplace. . . .There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of the states themselves to operate
freely in the market.""' The Court, drawing the analogy even closer,
delineated the policy in support of the market-participant doctrine: "[Sltate
proprietary activities may be, and often are, burdened with the same
restrictions imposed on private market participants. Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting as proprietors, states should similarly share existing freedoms from federal constraints, including the inherent limits of
the Commerce Clause."' 0'
The Court implies that the private-actor analogy identifies when the
effects of the state's actions in buying and selling permissibly affect
interstate commerce and, therefore, do not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The policy behind the Commerce Clause power was to allow
access to every market in the United States, access which encourages
every craftsman to produce. 0 2 As a market participant, the state's actions
as a buyer or seller do not violate this policy because the state is not
prohibiting businessmen from seeking markets but only restricting to
95. See White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 207 & n.3
(1983); Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436-39 (1980).
96. See White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. 429, 438 & n.10 (1980).
97. See White, 460 U.S. at 207 & n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-39.
98. See White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
99. See White, 460 U.S. at 207 & n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-39 (1980).
100. White, 460 U.S. at 207; See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37; Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 807-10 (1976).
101. White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3 (quoting Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438-39)).
102. Alexandria Scrap, 427 U.S. at 808.
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whom the state will issue government contracts and to whom the state
will sell state-owned resources.'0 3
While the United States Supreme Court has not expounded on the
private-actor analogy, the result in a Fifth Circuit case, Department of
Agriculture of Georgiav. Smith, " suggests that the private-actor analogy
is only one tool to determine when the state is unconstitutionally affecting
commerce."0 5 In Smith, the Fifth Circuit held that Georgia violated the
dormant Commerce Clause"° when Georgia preferentially rented to residents the best spaces in a farmer's market owned by the state and operated
by the State Department of Agriculture."0 7 The court rejected the state's
contention that the state was a seller of a space in which to sell vegetables.' Instead, the court went beyond the private-actor analogy and
looked to the actual effect on the buying and selling of vegetables."9 In
essence, Georgia was limiting the right of residents to buy from nonresident individuals and limiting the right of nonresident sellers from selling
to residents."'
The result in Smith implies that at some point, even if the state is acting
as a private actor, the effect of the state's actions on interstate commerce
become impermissible. At one extreme of protecting interstate commerce,
in other than a market-participant analysis, the Supreme Court has applied
the Pike test to determine whether the state was violating the dormant
Commerce Clause by impermissibly burdening commerce."' The question arises as to whether the private-actor analogy is avoiding the Pike
test or is only elucidating the Pike test and identifying where the burden
on commerce is incidental and the local benefits outweigh the burden on
commerce.
As shown by Reeves, Alexandria Scrap, and White, the policies and
statutes of the states in the market-participant cases did impose a burden
on commerce and would normally have failed the Pike test. In Alexandria
Scrap, the Court noted that under a traditional Pike test analysis, the
Maryland program might have been invalid because the Maryland program did reduce the flow of goods in interstate commerce. 2 The Court
in Alexandria Scrap invoked the market-participant doctrine after explicitly reiterating the District Court's finding that the Maryland program
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981).
See White, 460 U.S. at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
See Smith, 630 F.2d at 1085.
See id. at 1082.
See id. at 1033.
See id. at 1084-85.
See id. at 1033.
See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
See Alexandria Scrap, 427 U.S. at 805.
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imposed "substantial burdens upon the free flow of interstate commerce. "113 Moreover, the Court was willing to accept the characterization
of the Maryland program as "reducing in some manner the flow of goods
in interstate commerce."' Similarly, in White, the Court indicated that
it would not look to the burden on commerce once the state had successfully established itself as a market participant." 5 "Impact on out-ofstate residents figures in the equation only after it is decided that the city
is regulating the market rather than participating in it, for only in the
former case need it be determined whether any burden on interest commerce is permitted by the Commerce Clause."" 6
In short, the Court did not apply the Pike test. First, in each marketparticipant case where the Court has upheld the state policy or state statute,
the policy or statute failed the first element of the Pike test:1 7 the statutes
failed to treat interstate and intrastate commerce equally by failing to
treat residents and nonresidents equally. 8 Second, the policies or statutes
did not "incidently" burden interstate commerce. Conversely, the state
was directly seeking to impede commerce between the states and to favor
in-state residents." 9 Third, the Court did not require the state to show a
legitimate local benefit."' 0 Instead, the state avoided Commerce Clause
scrutiny by designing state policies to protect private economic interests
within the state from forces of the interstate market, the very protectionism.
that the Commerce Clause sought to prohibit.'
As the Court noted in Reeves, the central point of the Alexandria Scrap
Court's analysis was that, under the market-participant doctrine, the state
did not have to demonstrate an "independent justification," a local need,
to sustain Maryland's program.' 2 2 Instead of focusing on the local benefits
113. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436 n.7 (quoting Alexandria Scrap, 427 U.S. at 804).
114. Id. (quoting AlexandriaScrap, 427 U.S. at 805).
115. See White, 460 U.S. at 210.
116. Id.
117. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
118. See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. 429.
119. See id. at 448 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("Regardless of the nature of the product the
State hoards, the consumer has been denied the guarantee of the Commerce Clause that he 'may
look to ... free competition from every producing area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation
by any."' (quoting H. D. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949))).
120. See jd. at 452, 453 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell argued in Reeves that the state had no
justification for favoring private, in-state customers over out-of-state customers. While the state
concern in Alexandria Scrap conceivably was environmental, the Reeves Court noted that in AlexandriaScrap the state did not have to demonstrate a local need for Maryland's discriminatory statute.
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442 n.16. Moreover, the Court in Alexandria Scrap did not discuss whether
environmental goals could be served by less burdensome means as required by the Pike test, see
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, or whether the state demonstrated a close fit between the statute and the
statute's asserted local purpose, as required by Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S.

941, 957 (1982).
121. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 447 (Powell, J., dissenting).
122. See id. at 442 n.16.
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of environmental protection or conservation, the Court delineated two
policy reasons for validating the states' activities: restraint counseled by
considerations of state sovereignty," and the recognized right of a trader
or manufacturer, engaged in a private business, to freely exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. 124 The market-participant test focuses on the rights of the state as a separate entity
rather than on the necessities of the local community.
B. The Sovereignty View
The market-participant classification could also function to identify
when fundamental sovereignty of the states insulates the states from
dormant Commerce Clause intrusion. In Reeves and White, the Supreme
Court found support for classsifying the state as a market participant in
considerations of state sovereignty."z The Court stated that the state had
a measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to decide how, with
whom, and for whose benefit to deal.126 Moreover, the Court in Reeves
found that "restraint in this area is counseled by consideration of state
the role of each state as a guardian and trustee for its peosovereignty,
27
ple. "1
Just as the Court has not developed the private-actor analogy, the
Supreme Court has not established the boundaries of the state sovereignty
view. In National League of Cities v. Usery,'2 8 the Supreme Court, in
29
other than a market-participant analysis, created a Tenth Amendment
exception to Commerce Clause restraints. Usery concerned a federal
statute which imposed minimum wage constraints on the state's relationship with state employees. 130 States argued that the established constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity recognized in a series
of Supreme Court cases prevented Congress from imposing the wage
constraints on the states."' In Usery, in striking down the application of
minimum wage constraints to state employees, the Court recognized limits
upon the power of Congress to override state sovereignty. The Court
31 2
found an express declaration of this limitation in the Tenth Amendment.
123. See id. at 438.
124. See-id. at 438-39.
125. See White 460 U.S. at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
126. See White, 460 at 207 n.3; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 & n.10.
127. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438.
128. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). The test in Usery, although overruled by Garcia, is still relevant
U.S. -,
to the market-participant doctrine. For a discussion of the relevancy of the Usery test, see supra
notes 140-73 and accompanying text.
129. U.S. Const. amend X.
130. Usery, 426 U.S. at 835-37.
131. Id. at 837.
132. See id. at 842.
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The Tenth Amendment expressly states, "The power not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."' 33 According to the
Court in Usery, the Amendment declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the states'
ability to function effectively in a federal system.' 34
The Court in Usery held that even though Congress had plenary power
to regulate interstate commerce, the federal statute could not preempt
state wage policies because the state had proved three elements: 1) that
the federal statute regulated states as states; 3 ' 2) that the federal statute
infringed on vital attributes of state sovereignty; 136 and 3) that the state's
compliance with federal law would directly impair the state's ability to
structure operations in areas of traditional state function. 137 In subsequent
case law, the Supreme Court added a fourth element to the Usery test:
the state interest in controlling this area must be greater than the federal
interest. 3 The last factor, a balancing test, would uphold federal power
in areas such as environmental protection where federal interest is demonstrably greater and state compliance would be essential.' 3 9
In a recent case, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, "4the Court overruled Usery"4 in a five to four split. In Garcia, the
Court found that the political process in Congress protected state sovereignty and that the Tenth Amendment did not limit Congress' power
under the Commerce Clause. 4' 2 The development of the Usery test, however, is still fundamental to the development of the market-participant
doctrine for two reasons. First, the Court has not yet addressed the effect
of the Tenth Amendment in a dormant Commerce Clause context in which
Congress has not legislated. The market-participant context is such an
instance and may mandate broader protection of state sovereignty than
afforded by the Garcia Court. Where Congress had acted, as in Garcia,
the Court refused to employ the Tenth Amendment on the grounds that
the political process had already accommodated state sovereignty. 'I In
contrast, in the market-participant cases, no political safeguards exist
because Congress has not enacted legislation. Second, while the Tenth
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
(1981).
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

U.S. Const. amend. X.
See Usery, 426 U.S. at 843.
Id.at854.
Id. at 845.
Id. at 852.
See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 & n.29
Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
See 105 S. Ct. at 1021.
See id. at 1017-20.
See id. at 1017-18.
__
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Amendment cases provide a framework for analysis, the market-participant cases may rest on principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution rather than on the Tenth Amendment specifically. Thus, the failure
of the Tenth Amendment to provide substantive relief would not be determinative.
The Usery test, however, contains inherent weaknesses as an analytical
tool that may minimize its applicability to market-participant cases. In
applying the market-participant classification to South Dakota's distribution of state-produced cement, the majority in Reeves, citing to Usery,
stated: "Considerations of sovereignty independently dictate that marketplace actions involving 'integral operations in areas of traditional government functions'-such as employment of certain state workers-may
not be subject even to congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce
power."' However, the type of operations that the state was performing
in Reeves differed significantly from the examples which the Usery court
listed. The Usery court found that the state performs integral government
functions when the state determines the wages and working hours of
government employees 45 and locates its own seat of government.'" In
addition, the Court in Usery was only willing to apply the Tenth Amendment restraints on Congress' Commerce Clause power when the traditional
state functions involved were "functions essential to separate and independent existence." 147 Arguably, the state could still function without
assuming the role of a private business in buying abandoned automobiles,
as the state did in Alexandria Scrap; in preferring state residents in
construction contracts, as the state did in White; and in distributing cement, as the state did in Reeves. Accordingly, the Supreme Court in
Reeves admitted that such businesses were not operations "integral" to
the state. 148
Case law subsequent to Usery has affirmed that businesses similar to
those discussed in the market-participant cases are not an "integral part
of traditional state activities generally immune from federal regulation. "'49 For example, in TransportationUnion v. Long IslandR.R. Co., 5
the Court held that the Tenth Amendment did not protect the states from
application of the Railway Labor Act'5 ' allowing public employees, working on a state-owned passenger railroad, to strike.' 52 The Court reasoned
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.10.
See Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
Id.
Id.
See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.10.
Transportation Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678, 685 (1982).
455 U.S. 678 (1982).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982).
TransportationUnion, 455 U.S. at 682.
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that private industry, not the state, has traditionally operated passenger
railroads.' 53 Moreover, the Court found "no justification for a rule which
would allow the states, by acquiring functions previously performed by
the private sector, to erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject
to federal statutory regulation." '54 Because the federal government determined that a uniform regulatory scheme was necessary to the operation55
of the national rail system, the states had to defer to federal legislation.1
In addition, the Court held in Equal Employment OpportunityCommission
v. Wyoming'5 6 that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,
enacted under Commerce Clause powers,' 57 preempted the state's policy
of mandatory retirement of its game wardens at age fifty-five.' 58 In response to the state's claim of Tenth Amendment immunity, 5 9 the Court
found that the management of state parks is clearly a traditional state
function, but that federal intrusion did not threaten the state's "separate
and independent existence.""
According to the Court in EEOC, Usery had identified two areas that
merited Tenth Amendment protection: 1) state financial resources,' 6' and
2) the pursuit of broad social and economic policies.' 6 2 The test of financial
effect does not depend on the actual impact on the state's finances but
on a generalized inquiry, essentially legal rather than factual, into the
direct and obvious effect of the federal legislation on the ability of the
states to allocate their resources. 63 The Court concluded that the federal
statute in EEOC would not have a direct or obvious negative effect on65
state finances" nor affect broader social or economic goals of the state.
Similarly, as the dissent in Reeves argued, dormant Commerce Clause
restrictions on buying abandoned automobiles and on distributing cement
to citizens do not interfere with traditional functions which are essential
to the state as a sovereign.' 66 Unlike minimum wage restrictions which
would require the state to spend its treasury, the dormant Commerce
Clause restrictions applied to such businesses do not deplete the state
treasury, although, in the instance of White and Alexandria Scrap, the
restrictions affected how the state allocated the treasury.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 686.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688.
460 U.S. 226 (1983).
Id. at 235.

158. Id. at 243-44.
159. See id. at 236.
160. Id. at 239.
161. Id. at 240.
162. Id. at 242.

163. Id. at 240.
164. Id. at 241.
165. Id. at 242.
166. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 449-54. (Powell, J., dissenting).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

Despite the inherent weaknesses in using the Usery test to explain the
market-participant doctrine, the need to protect state sovereignty may still
have motivated the development of the market-participant doctrine. One
interpretation of the market-participant doctrine is that the Court has
eliminated the requirement that the state, to assert immunity, must be
operating in areas of traditional state functions integral to state sovereignty. In overruling Usery, the Court in Garcia noted the difficulty in
applying the Usery test and stated that a test that seeks to isolate important
governmental functions cannot be faithful to the role of federalism in a
democratic society. 67 The Court suggested that the states have broader
power to control their own actions than afforded by the Usery test, although such power must be exercised in the federal political arena.' 68
According to the Court, the essence of the federal system is that, within
the realm of authority left open to the states under the Constitution, the
states must be equally free to engage in any activity that their citizens
choose for the common weal, no matter how unorthodox anyone deems
state involvement.' 69 "Any rule of state immunity that looks to the 'traditional,' 'integral,' or 'necessary' nature of govermental functions inevitably invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes." 7 '
In the dormant Commerce Clause context, the Court has even more
reason to dispense with the traditional functions test and allow the states
greater latitude in structuring their relations with their own citizens and
in controlling state resources. In explicitly rejecting the Usery limitations
on the protection of state sovereignty, the majority in Reeves asserted
that "[e]ven where 'integral operations' are not implicated, States may
fairly claim some measure of sovereign interest in retaining freedom to
decide how, with whom, and for whose benefit to deal." 7 1 The Court in
Reeves noted that "the competing considerations in cases involving state
proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and
difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis."' 72 The
Court, in establishing the market-participant doctrine, found, as in Garcia, that the adjustment of interests in this context is a task better suited
for Congress than the Court.'7 3 The market-participant doctrine, thus
allows the political process, not the courts, to maintain the balance of
power between Congress and the states. The market-participant doctrine,
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1015.
See id.
See id.
Id.
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 438 n.10.
Id. at 439.
See id.
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however, permits the states to act until Congress expressly prohibits the
states' activities, whereas in Garcia, Congress had already expressly
prohibited the states' activities.
THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE:
BALANCING THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
WITH STATE SOVEREIGNTY
The private-actor analogy and the sovereignty view do not adequately
explain the market-participant doctrine. They only suggest that the Court
has extended the Usery test and its protection of state sovereignty and
has rejected the Pike test and its protection of the dormant Commerce
Clause powers. They do not define the limits of the market-participant
doctrine but only illustrate that the market-participant doctrine, somewhere in between the Pike test and the Usery test, is yet another test
which balances the dormant Commerce Clause with state sovereignty. In
defining the parameters of the market-participant doctrine, the Court has,
however, held that selling state-manufactured goods preferentially to state
residents is permissible'74 but that state regulation of goods and natural
resources after sale to private parties is impermissible.'7 5
A. Protection of the Dormant Commerce Clause Powers
The market-participant cases suggest that the market-participant doctrine protects the dormant Commerce Clause powers by prohibiting the
state from imposing contractual restrictions that exceed the state's interest
in initial distribution of state resources.' 76 The Court has prohibited two
types of "secondary" restrictions by the states which affect commerce
beyond the immediate transaction between the state and a private party:
1) restrictions which preclude business between nonresidents and the party
in privity with the state,"' and 2) restrictions which preclude out-of-state
processing or any exportation of the resource. 78 In each case in which
the state was not imposing these "secondary" restrictions, the Court held
that the state was not acting as a market regulator but only as a market
participant and was immune from the dormant Commerce Clause.'7 9
174. See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. 429.
175. See, e.g., Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237.
176. See, e.g., id. at 2246.
177. See, e.g., Department of Agriculture of Ga. v. Smith, 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981); Cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 534 (1978) (Although the Court
ultimately invalidated the Alaska statute under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, the Court implied that a dormant Commerce Clause analysis would have produced
the same result.)
178. See, e.g., Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237; New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6.
179. See, e.g., White, 460 U.S. 204; Reeves, 447 U.S. 429; AlexandriaScrap, 426 U.S. 794.
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The Court has indicated that the market-participant doctrine does not
immunize a state from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny when the state
imposes restrictions which preclude business between nonresidents and
' the Court held
the party in privity with the state. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 80
that Alaska had violated the Constitution 8 ' when Alaska enacted a statute
requiring that all gas leases, to which Alaska was a party, contain the
requirement that the lessee hire residents in preference to nonresidents.' 82
The statute applied to all employment which was a result of oil and gas
leases and which took place on the property under the lessee's control.' 83
Moreover, the statute applied to activity either performed directly for the
lessee or "his contractor or a subcontractor of his contractor or a supplier
of his contractor or subcontractor."' 8 4 The statute, therefore, extended to
employers who had no connection with the state's oil and gas, performed
relationship with the state, and
no work on state land, had no contractual
85
received no payment from the state. 1
Alaska, while not explicitly claiming status as a market participant,
alleged that the state owned all of the oil and gas that was regulated by
the statute and could, therefore, regulate the employment of labor connected with the leases.' 86 The federal government had granted to Alaska
'
full title to lands and to minerals on 103 million acres of land in Alaska. 87
The Court rejected the state's contention that the state could regulate the
employment of labor only tenuously connected with the leases. Although
the Court ultimately found for the nonresident plaintiffs on the grounds
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 8 the Court implied that, under
both the dormant Commerce Clause and the Privileges and Immunities
Clause, the "breadth of the discrimination mandated.., goes far beyond
the degree of resident bias Alaska's ownership of the oil and gas can
justifiably support."89
180. 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The nonresident plaintiffs alleged that the statute violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1, and the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const.
amend. XIV. 437 U.S. at 520. The nonresidents did not allege that the statute violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. See 437 U.S. at 531.
181. See id. at 534.
182. Id. at 520.
183. Id. at 529-30.
184. Id. at 530.
185. Id.
186. See id. at 528.
187. Id. at 528 n.ll.
188. U.S. Const. art. IV §2, cl. 1; 437 U.S. at 531-34.
189. Id. at 534. Subsequent case law has held that, in some instances, the Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis differs from the dormant Commerce Clause analysis in a market-participant
context. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Camden County & Vicinity v. Mayor &
U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). In a Privileges and Immunities analysis,
Council of Camden, "'rather than placing a statute completely beyond the Clause, a State's ownership of the property
with which the statute is concerned is a factor-although often the crucial factor-to be considered
in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination against noncitizens violates the Clause."' Id., 104
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Similarly, the Fifth Circuit invalidated a state policy which restricted
business transactions between nonresidents and the party in privity with
the state. The Fifth Circuit, in DepartmentofAgriculture v. Smith,' 9 held
that a state policy was regulatory and violated the dormant Commerce
Clause because the state had directly narrowed nonresident access to the
private market in goods and services. 9' The trial court found that the
state had preferred residents over nonresidents by leasing to residents the
best spaces in a farmer's market owned by the state. 9 Further, the trial
court found that the preferential leasing diminished nonresident seller's
access to transactions with resident buyers.' 93 The Fifth Circuit held that
the state's ownership of the vegetable market spaces did not permit the
state to restrict the business practices of the nonresident vegetable sellers
and, thus, the preferential leasing violated the dormant Commerce Clause. "
The Court has also held state policies or statutes unconstitutional that
have limited the exportation or out-of-state processing of the resource. 195
In the past, the states have defended their restrictions on exportation and
processing by alleging that the state had ownership rights in the product
or resource even after a second party had taken possession of the product
or resource. 96 The states based their claims of continual ownership on
the theory that the state was the trustee of all natural resources in the
state,' 97 regardless of the fact that a private individual had reduced the
resource to possession in accordance with the common law requirements. '
Initially, the Supreme Court agreed with the states' contentions of
continual ownership of state resources and held in Geer v. Connecticut 99
S. Ct. at 1029 (1984) (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 529 (1978)). The Privileges and
Immunities Clause protects those rights peculiar to being a citizen of the federal government, including
the right to petition Congress, the right to enter federal lands, and the right to interstate travel. J.
NowAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTONAL LAW 414 (1983). Thus, instead of applying the
market-participant analysis which weighs state autonomy against the federal Commerce Clause
interest, the courts have to weigh state autonomy against an individual's interest.
190. 630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981).
191. See id.at 1083.
192. Id. at 1082.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 1085.
195. See, e.g., Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237; New England Power Co., 455 U.S. at 338 n.6.
196. See, e.g., Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928).
197. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
198. In Geer, the defendant was adjudged guilty of violating a statute which prohibited the killing
of a woodcock, ruffled grouse, or quail, for the purpose of conveying the same beyond the state
lines of Connecticut. Geer, 161 U.S. at 519-20. In upholding the statute, the Court noted that
although every citizen traditionally has had a right to reduce a part of the common property in game
to ownership by possession, it has also been true that the right has always been regulated by the
state. Id. at 523-24.
199. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
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that a state could prohibit the export of game killed within the state. °°
However, in Hughes v. Oklahoma,2 "1 the Court overruled Geer2 °2 and
found that the state's trustee allegation, the theory that the state continues
to own in trust the state's resources even after a private party has reduced
the resource to private possession, was only a fiction used to describe
the state's police power. 3 Subsequently, in New England Power Co. v.
New Hampshire,2' the Court found that a market-participant classification
did not allow the state to restrict the interstate sale of electric energy by
a private company which utilized state waters in producing the electricity.2"5 The Court reasoned that the sale of electric energy was entirely
distinct from the waters used to create the energy.2" 6 Finally, in SouthCentral Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke,20 7 while the state may
validly prefer residents in the initial sale of a state-owned resource, 0 8 the
Court held that the dormant Commerce Clause precluded Alaska from
imposing in-state processing restraints after the severance of the timber
from state land and the sale to timber companies. 0 9
The market-participant doctrine has immunized the state from dormant
Commerce Clause scrutiny when the state has acted as a buyer and seller
in the marketplace and the state neither has precluded business transactions between third parties and the party in privity with the state nor has
restricted the exportation of the resource after sale to the party in privity
with the state. For example, in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,210 in
upholding the state statute, the Court found that the state was not regulating the sale of inoperable automobiles between private individuals.2 '
In Reeves v. Stake,2" 2 in validating the state policy, the Court stated that
the situation did not involve a state's attempt to prevent privately owned
goods from being sold in interstate commerce." 3 South Dakota did not
cut off access to its own cement altogether." 4 The state's policy did not
bar resale of South Dakota cement to out-of-state purchasers." 5 Finally,
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 534-35.
441 U.S. 322 (1979).
See id. at 325.
See id. at 334-35.
455 U.S. 331 (1982).
See id. at 338 n.6.
See id.
-_ U.S. -_, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
See 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
See id.
426 U.S. 794 (1976).
Id. at 806.
447 U.S. 429 (1980).
Id. at 444 n.17.
Id.
Id.
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in White v. MassachusettsCouncil of ConstructionEmployers," 6 the Court
determined that the municipality was not regulating contractors in their
commercial transactions with other private entities.2" 7 Even though the
state required contractors accepting city construction contracts to use a
work force of at least half city residents,"1 8 the Court found that "[e]veryone
affected by the order [was], in a substantial if informal sense, 'working
for the city. """The Court, therefore, held that the state was not imposing
restrictions beyond 22the immediate parties with which the government
transacted business.
B. Protection of State Sovereignty
As noted above, in the market-participant cases, the Court has extended
the Tenth Amendment protection of state power further than in the active
Commerce Clause cases. In National League of Cities v. Usery,"' the
state functions involved had to be "functions essential to separate and
independent existence" of the state.222 In the market-participant cases,
the Court has broadened this protection in the dormant Commerce Clause
context. In contexts in which the federal government did not regulate the
activity but had the power to regulate, the Court has allowed the state to
preferentially distribute state-manufactured goods, as in Reeves v. Stake,'
and has allowed the state to preferentially buy goods and services with
the state treasury, as in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap224 and in White v.
Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers.'m The question remains as to how far the Tenth Amendment extends in protecting state
activity when the state is not placing secondary restrictions on private
parties.
In applying the Tenth Amendment in other than a dormant Commerce
Clause context, the Court in Usery attempted to isolate those functions
most essential to the states as separate governmental entities."26 The Tenth
Amendment prohibited Congress from "acting in ways that would leave
a state formally intact but functionally a gutted shell"' 7 and gave the
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.

460 U.S. 204 (1983).
See id. at 211 n.7.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 211 n.7.
See id.

221. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
222. Id. at 845.
223. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
224. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).

225. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
226. See Usery, 426 U.S. at 845.
227. L. TRIaE, Arm1IcAN CoNsmrnoNAL LAW 310 (1976).
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power and sovereignty of the state real meaning.22 8 Thus, the Court has
held that the Tenth Amendment protects those essential functions of the
state, such as providing traditional state services. 9
In the market-participant cases, in contrast to Usery, the Court has
extended protection of the state's autonomy beyond protection of essential
functions. As suggested by the private-actor analogy, the Court has extended protection of the state's autonomy to cover rights thought to be
essential to an individual businessman's autonomy."' In these cases, the
market-participant doctrine protects states which are acting as private
actors because states should be free from restraints of trade just as private
individuals should be free from restraints in buying and selling. 1 A
private enterprise could have the resources for a large scale operation,
such as the cement plant in Reeves, and substantially burden commerce.
However, no court would be able to use the dormant Commerce Clause
analysis to strike down a private enterprise's operation, although Congress
could regulate the private enterprise.
The market-participant doctrine, however, only protects the state's
greatest interest as a private trader by protecting only those contractual
provisions which promote the state's interest in initial distribution of state
resources and which only affect the initial buyer. Accordingly, the Court
in Wunnicke held that the state could not impose processing restraints
because "a state market participant has a greater interest as a 'private
trader' in the immediate transaction than it has in what its purchaser does
'
In
with the goods after the state no longer has an interest in them."232
addition, in narrowly interpreting the scope of state autonomy afforded
by the market-participant doctrine, the Seventh Circuit refused to extend
market-participant protection to states when the state tried to limit the
contractual relations of the state's own political subdivisions. 3
In W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi,2 34 the Seventh Circuit held that
an Illinois statute requiring that a contractor in any public works project
preferentially employ available Illinois laborers violated the dormant
Commerce Clause. 5 In Bernardi, the public school board of Decatur,
Illinois hired a window company to replace windows.236 The window
company, in turn, subcontracted the work to an unincorporated association
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

See id.
See, e.g., Usery, 426 U.S. 833.
See Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244, 2246.
See White, 460 U.S. at 207 & n.3.; Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-39.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
Id.
See id.at 496.
Id. at 489.
Id.
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of Missouri residents.237 The Illinois Director of the Department of Labor
brought a suit in state court to enjoin the association from violating the
Illinois preference law."
In holding the statute unconstitutional, the court reasoned that the
market participant was the school board, not the state.23 9 The windowreplacement project was not even partially financed by the state. 2" Also,
the court concluded that had the state limited the preference law to construction projects financed by the state, the law would not have violated
the dormant Commerce Clause. 241
The dormant Commerce Clause's restriction on state power, the prohibition of restraints which affect businessmen beyond the immediate
parties with whom the state government is transacting business, reveals
that the Court, while analogizing the state to a private actor, is not equating
the state with a private actor. The Court struggles with the breadth of
state sovereignty and grasps at one insular concept that allows the state
limited autonomy: the concept of contractual freedom. The Court, however, acknowledges that, unlike a private actor, the state seeks to design
state policies to protect its citizens' economic interests.242 Because this
type of protectionism, allegedly, has historically violated the Commerce
Clause, 43 at some level, the dormant Commerce Clause still restricts the
state even when the state acts as a private actor.
THE EXTENSION OF THE MARKET-PARTICIPANT DOCTRINE
The Court has addressed the validity of the state's actions in distributing
state-manufactured goods 2 " and in buying goods and services with the
state treasury. 245 Because of the limited history of the market-participant
doctrine, the Court has not yet ruled on the validity of state subsidies
distributed solely to local businesses for processing state-owned resources 2'
nor has the Court ruled on whether the state can distribute state natural
resources solely to state residents. However, the Court in South-Central
Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke2 47 suggested that both state acts
238. Id. at 490.
239. See id. at 495.
240. See id.
241. See id.
242. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at 442.
243. See id. at 447 (Powell, J. dissenting).
244. See Reeves, 447 U.S. 429.
245. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. 794; White, 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
246. While Alexandria Scrap concerned state subsidies, in AlexandriaScrap, the state subsidized
both resident and nonresidents although the state made it more difficult for nonresidents to obtain

the subsidy. See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 796-97, 800-01.
247.

-

U.S. -,

104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
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are permissible.248 In addition, the Court in Wunnicke analogized the.
market-participant doctrine to antitrust law to illustrate the permissible
extension of the market-participant doctrine.249
A. Distributionof State Subsidies to Residents
The Court has suggested that state subsidies which extend only to instate businesses and which give local businesses a market advantage are
constitutional. The Court in Wunnicke would not allow the state to require
buyers of the state-owned timber to locally mill the logs because the state
was contractually restricting the use of timber after the state had sold
it.so The Court, however, indicated that the state could subsidize a local
mill for processing local logs because the timber-processing industry was
not required but had the option of passing on the subsidy by reducing
prices for processing of local logs. 5 While both the state's practices in
Wunnicke and in the hypothetical posed by the Wunnicke Court arguably
burden interstate commerce in almost indistinguishable ways, the Court
stated "[D]ownstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than
do limits on immediate transactions. Instead of merely choosing its own
trading partners, the [s]tate is attempting to govern the private, separate
economic relationships with trading partners; that is, it restricts the postpurchase activity of the purchaser." 2
The validity of a subsidy to local processing mills is a logical extension
of Alexandria Scrap. In Alexandria Scrap, differing from the hypothetical
posed in Wunnicke, the state subsidized both resident and nonresidents
for the processing of inoperable automobiles."s3 The state, however, required less documentation from local processors,54 thus making the subsidies more accessible to local processors. As in Alexandria Scrap, the
Court in Wunnicke returned to the distinction between immediate and
secondary restrictions in explaining the validity of a subsidy to local
processing mills. 55 In subsidizing the in-state processing mills, the state
would neither preclude business between a third party and the party in
privity with the state nor mandate the manufacturing practices of the party
in privity with the state.5 6 The Court in Wunnicke also reaffirmed that
248. 104 S. Ct. at 2244.
249. See id. at 2246.
250. Id. at 2244.
251. See id. "If the state directly subsidized the timber-processing industry by such an amount,
the purchaser would retain the option of taking advantage of the subsidy by processing timber in
the state or foregoing the benefits of the subsidy and exporting unprocessessed timber." Id.
252. Id. at 2246.
253. Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 796-97.
254. Id. at 800-01.
255. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
256. See id.
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the market-participant test is, unlike the Pike test, only prohibiting the
extreme burden on interstate commerce-burdens such as contractual and
statutory limitations which preclude rather than merely influence business
practices. The Court implied that a subsidy to in-state processing mills
and the in-state processing requirement might equally burden commerce," 57 although only the latter and not the former would violate the
dormant Commerce Clause.
B. The AntitrustAnalogy
In explaining the hypothetical in Wunnicke and in illustrating the permissible extension of the market-participant doctrine, the Court analogized the market-participant doctrine to antitrust law."5s The Court compared
the difference between vertical integration and vertical restraints under
antitrust law to permissible and impermissible state activity under the
market-participant doctrine.2 9 Just as antitrust law permits businessmen
to affect the market by vertical integration, the market-participant doctrine
permits the state to subsidize residents and to preferentially distribute
state-owned natural resources to residents. 2" Just as antitrust law prohibits
businessmen from imposing vertical restraints, the market-participant
doctrine prohibits the state from precluding business transactions between
a third party and the party in privity with the state and from imposing
processing restraints.26 '
Under antitrust law, with some restrictions, a private businessman may
legitimately affect the market, in which he buys or sells goods, by vertical
integration: merging different companies which each complete a different
step in the production and distribution of a product.262 In addition, with
some restrictions, a businessman can limit where and to whom he might
sell the product and can limit where and to whom his subsidiaries and
his consignees might sell.263 Similarly, under the market-participant doc257. See id. "It is no defense in an action charging vertical restraints that the same end could be
acheived through vertical integration; if it were, there would be virtually no antitrust scrutiny of
vertical arrangements. We reject the contention that a State's action as a market regulator may be
upheld against Commerce Clause challenge on the ground that the State could achieve the same end
as a market participant. We therefore find it unimportant for present purposes that the state could
support its processing industry by selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integration, or by

direct subsidy." Id.
258. See id.
259. See id.
260. See id. at 2244, 2246.

261. See id. at 2246.
262. See L. SULUVAN, HANDBOOK OF Ta LAW OF ATrrrrusT 376, 404 (1977).
263. See id. at 403-05. In applying federal antitrust laws, the courts have developed two approaches: the rule of reason and the per se doctrine. Id. at 153. "The rule of reason calls for a broad
inquiry into the nature, purpose and effect of any challenged arrangement before a decision is made
about its legality." Id. The final question is whether the restriction imposed substantially impedes
commerce. Id. at 188. Where there seems to be legitimate purposes and where effects are both
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trine, the state can limit where and to whom it might sell a product. 26
A businessman, however, cannot impose vertical restraints. For example, a businessman cannot legally confine the freedom of an independent retailer, who has purchased the businessman's product, and restrict
where and to whom the retailer might resell.265 In addition, in most
instances, the businessman cannot legally impose tying restrictions on an
independent retailer and make the sale of the first product contingent on
the purchase of a second product from the businessman. 21 Similarly, the
market-participant doctrine prohibits the state from restricting where and
to whom the retailer might resell and from making the sale of the resource
contingent on in-state processing.267
The antitrust analogy identifies the important distinction between state
restraints which only affect the parties in privity with the state and contractual restrictions that affect businessmen beyond the immediate parties
with whom the state government is transacting business. As Lawrence
Sullivan elucidated, vertical integration is not per se illegal because "restraints arising out of the integration are not naked restraints; they are
the concomitants of a new investment and, it may well be, of attained
efficiencies." 268 As well, vertical integration has social value. To forbid
integration would remove the restraints at the cost of the social values
associated with it.269 "Knowing this cost, the law does not make the
integration per se illegal, but holds it illegal only if the restraints have a
discernable bite." '27 Like vertical restraints, neither state subsidies nor
preferential distribution in the market-participant cases are naked restraints on the business practices of the party in privity with the state. In
adverse and beneficial, the courts must discriminate between finely shaded gradients. Id. In comparison, "the per se doctrine labels as illegal any practice to which it applies, regardless of the
reasons for the practices and without extended inquiry as to its effects." Id. at 153. In United States
v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the Court distinguished between merchandise sold
by Schwinn to distributors and merchandise handled by distributors as consignees or as sales agents
taking orders for Schwinn. The Court found that resale restraints in the former were per se violations
of the antitrust laws whereas resale restraints in the latter were permissible. The Court noted an
important distinction "between the situation where the manufacturer parts with title, dominion, or
risk with respect to the article, and where he completely retains ownership and risk." Id. at 37879.
264. See, e.g., Reeves, 447 U.S. 429.
265. See Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. at 377-78. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 262,
at 403-05.
266. See L. SULLIVAN, supranote 262, at 431. Courts have repeatedly stated that the arrangements
are aperse violation of the antitrust laws. Id. However, as Sullivan cautions, the sweeping assignment
of per se illegality should not be taken at face value. See id. at 431. For factors the courts consider
in determining whether the tying arrangement violates antitrust laws, see supra notes 275-77 and
accompanying text.
267. See Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
268. L. SU.LVAN, supra note 262, at 405.
269. Id.
270. Id.
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contrast, as the result in Wunnicke suggests, the state has a greater capacity
to monopolize the market through secondary restraints which are contractually binding than through restraints which only affect the immediate
" '
parties in privity with the state.27
However, like the private-actor analogy and the sovereignty view, the
antitrust analogy is a tool of limited utility. The Court has not equated
the limits of the market-participant doctrine with antitrust limitations nor
has the Court equated the state with a private businessman. Differing
from antitrust law, the market-participant doctrine promotes favoritism
towards state citizens,272 whereas vertical integration in the private marketplace promotes economic efficiency and the growth of capitalism.27
In addition, precluding the state's activity as a market-participant does
not abolish free enterprise but abolishes state sovereignty.274
Finally, the market-participant doctrine may prohibit state activity where,
in many instances, the antitrust laws would not. The antitrust laws may
not have served to automatically invalidate Alaska's actions in Wunnicke.
In Times-Picayne Publishing Co. v. United States,275 the Court held that
tying violates antitrust statutes "only if the defendant has substantial
market power in the tying product and a substantial volume of commerce
on the tied product is restrained. ,276 While subsequent antitrust law has
vacillated in determining when a tying arrangement is a per se violation
of antitrust law, the lowest standard requires proof of the tying product's
desirability to consumers or uniqueness of the product's attributes.277 The
Court in Wunnicke did not even attempt to discuss the uniqueness of state
timber from other sources of timber probably in an effort to avoid the
maze of antitrust law. Instead, the Court held that the in-state processing
restrictions per se exceeded the confines of the market-participant doctrine.278 This result suggests that the dormant Commerce Clause is more
restrictive than antitrust law.
A Ninth Ciruit opinion, Western Oil & Gas Ass. v. Cory 2 79 affirmed
by an equally divided Supreme Court in a per curiam memorandum
decision, closely approximates the Court's reasoning in prior marketparticipant cases and illustrates the correlation between antitrust law and
271. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2244. Cf. id. at 2247. After concluding that Alaska's actions did
not qualify for the market-participant exception, in applying the Pike test, the Court noted, "Viewed
as a naked restraint on export of unprocessed logs, there is little question that the processing
requirement cannot survive scrutiny under the precedents of the Court." Id.
272. See supra notes 244-49 and accompanying text.
273. See L. SULuVAN, supra note 262, at 405, 657-58.
274. See supra notes 221-43 and accompanying text.
275. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
276. See L. SuLUvAN, supra note 262, at 437.
277. See id. at 439.
278. See Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
279. 726 F.2d 1340, aff'd mem. U.S. , 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985).
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the market-participant doctrine. In Cory, the Ninth Circuit invalidated
California regulations that imposed a fee on oil refineries for the volume
of oil which had to pass over state-owned tidelands conveyed to California
by Congress.28 California had set a minimum annual rent of eight percent
of the appraised value of the land to which California added a surcharge
based on the volume of commodities passing over the leased land. 28' The
plaintiffs owned and operated several refineries on the California coast
adjacent to the state land,282 piped petroleum substances to and from their
facilities through a system of pipelines,283 and channeled between 48-98
percent of the refineries' oil into interstate and foreign commerce. 2" Due
to the location of the plant, the pipelines had to traverse the tidal and
submerged lands owned by the state.285
In Cory, California alleged that, as a market participant, the state's
leasehold activities were immune from the dormant Commerce Clause.286
Despite such an allegation, after noting problems which distinguished
Cory from other market-participant cases,287 the Ninth Circuit held that
the state's rental agreement violated the dormant Commerce Clause.2 8
The court found that the permanency of the plaintiffs' facilities did not
permit them to "shop around." 2'89 There were no other competitors to
which the plaintiffs could go to rent the required strip of California
coastland. 29 In short, the state had a monopoly, complete control which
the plaintiffs to submit to the volumetric rental cost without
required 29
recourse. 1
Again, as in Wunnicke, the court in Cory did not analyze the case
under antitrust laws nor equate dormant Commerce Clause restrictions
with antitrust law. Proof of the existence of monopoly power alone does
not prove that California was violating antitrust laws.292 If monopoly
power arises solely from the fact that the market is small or solely from
the possession of a lawful patent or franchise, and if the firm does not
abuse the power by exceeding normal, honest industrial business conduct,
then the firm has a lawful monopoly.29 3 In Cory, no evidence existed that
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See id. at 1346.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1341.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1342.
Id. at 1342-43.
See id. at 1346.
Id. at 1343.
Id.

291. See id..
292. See L. SuuIvAN, supra note 262, at 94.
293. Id.
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California intended to achieve market power through acquisition of the
tidelands. Conversely, Congress thrust the monopoly upon California by
conveying the tidelands to California. Neither did the court inquire into
whether California violated antitrust law by abusing California's monopoly power but, instead, held that the state's surcharge constituted a naked
restraint on commerce and exceeded the market-participant doctrine. The
result in Cory again suggests that the dormant Commerce Clause is more
restrictive than antitrust law, although both consider the effect of market
power on market activity.
If the antitrust analogy is to be taken seriously and the market-participant doctrine only prohibits state activity which acts as a naked restraint
on the private market, then the Fifth Circuit in DepartmentofAgriculture
v. Smith2' may have incorrectly decided that the state could not claim
status as a market participant when Georgia preferentially rented to residents the best spaces in a farmer's market owned by the state and operated
by the State Department of Agriculture. While the court in Smith recognized that Georgia was limiting the right of residents to buy from
nonresident individuals,295 the court did not take into account that the
state did not contractually preclude the nonresidents from buying from
residents. The nonresidents could lease spaces, although the spaces were
not as preferable, and no evidence existed that the state had a monopoly
on farmers' markets. Privately owned markets may have been available.
Unlike the state's activities in Cory, the state did not have exclusive
market power. Moreover, it is hard to envision how the state's policy in
Smith differed from White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction
Employers296 in which the Supreme Court held constitutional the state's
action in requiring contractors completing city-funded construction projects to employ a work force of at least half city residents. 2' Both restricted
the private party's business relationship with a third party.
C. Extension of the Market-ParticipantDoctrine to Issues Specific to
Natural Resouces
The Court in Wunnicke also implied that the state might successfully
impede interstate commerce by distributing the timber to in-state processing mills. The state could distribute natural resources as preferentially
as manufactured goods, as the cement in Reeves, as long as the state did
not place any secondary restrictions on the resources. The Court, while
not expressly validating such preferential distribution, alluded to a specific
294.
295.
296.
297.

630 F.2d 1081 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 910 (1981).
See id. at 1083-85.
260 U.S. 204 (1983).
See id. at 214-15.
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quote in Foster-FountainPacking Co. v. Haydel in which the Haydel
Court noted that the state might have retained the shrimp for consumption
within its borders but "by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the
products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce, the state
release[d] its hold and ... terminate[d] its control. 298 Furthermore, the
Court explicitly distinguished the state restrictions in Wunnicke from "a
State's preferring its own residents in the initial disposition of goods when
it is a market participant." 2'
Preferential distribution of state-owned natural resources accords both
with the precedent set by the market-participant cases and with the antitrust analogy. The validity of the Wunnicke hypothetical, the distribution
of timber to in-state processing mills, is a logical extension of Reeves v.
Stake." Although not a natural resources case, Reeves held that the state
could constitutionally limit the distribution of state resources to state
residents.3"' Furthermore, in limiting the initial distribution of timber to
in-state processing mills, the state would neither preclude business between a third party and the party in privity with the state nor mandate
in-state processing by timber companies.
The Court, however, has suggested a distinction between natural resources and state-manufactured goods. In Reeves, in upholding the preferential distribution of state-owned cement, the Court stated that stateproduced cement, unlike raw resources, were the "end product of a
complex process whereby a costly physical plant and human labor act on
raw materials." 3 2 Subsequently, in Wunnicke, in striking down the state
statute imposing timber-processing restraints, the Court distinguished Reeves
on the grounds that Wunnicke involved three elements not present in
Reeves-foreign
commerce, restrictions on resale, and a natural re30 3
source.

The Court's distinction between natural resources and state-manufactured goods may serve one of two purposes. First, the Court may be
reiterating the basic principle, established in Hughes v. Oklahoma3' and
a long line of natural resources cases,30 5 that a state is without power to
prevent natural resources from being shipped and sold in interstate commerce on the ground that they are required to satisfy local demand.
298. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245 n.9 (quoting Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278
U.S. 1, 13 (1928)).
299. Id. at 2246.
300. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
301. See id. at 442.
302. Id. at 444.
303. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. at 2245.
304. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
305. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the Court may be acknowledging the difficulty in determining when the state "owns" natural resources and, thus, when the state
can sell natural resources in the marketplace.
The second issue, the issue of state ownership, is more complex when
the state alleges ownership of natural resources than when the state alleges
ownership of state-manufactured goods. In the case of state-manufactured
goods, the state, as the Court has indicated, has created an "ownership"
interest by mixing labor with the raw materials. 3" Similarly, the state has
little difficulty in establishing ownership if the natural resource is on state
public lands and subject to state extraction. Moreover, the Court has
established that the state cannot "own" the resource after the resource
has been reduced to private ownership." 7 The question remains, however,
as to whether the state "owns" all of the unappropriated natural resources
in the state which are not found on public land.
In all cases, regardless of the derivation of ownership or the type of
ownership, the Court will probably again balance protection of the dormant Commerce Clause with protection of state sovereignty. The Court
in Wunnicke has suggested that the market-participant doctrine represents
a balance between protection of the dormant Commerce Clause powers
and protection of state sovereignty."' The private-actor and antitrust analogies pinpoint when the state is acting in its least regulatory manner as
well as when the state should have the greatest autonomy in structuring
the state's business transactions: when the state is not imposing secondary
restrictions on the private party but only is furthering the state's interest
in initial distribution of state resources. 3" The state has a strong interest
in preserving the unappropriated resources within the state. As long as
the state does not hoard the resources by refusing to distribute the resources even to residents and as long as the state does not impose secondary restraints, the state arguably could act as a market participant in
the unappropriated resources.
Because the market-participant doctrine seeks to protect state sovereignty, the state, arguably, will only have to show a minimal level of
ownership of the natural resource to satisfy the court that the state is
fulfilling the market-participant classification. Otherwise, determination
of the level of labor a state must invest to "create" an ownership interest
in the natural resource may be just as difficult as the application of the
"integral and essential function" test of Usery. If the Court requires more
than a minimal level of state investment, then the Court truly will be
306. Reeves, 447 U.S. at 444.
307. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 173-243 and accompanying text.
309. See Wunnicke, U.S. at -. , 104 S. Ct. at 2246.
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promoting an "unelected federal judiciary to make 31°
decisions about which
state policies it favors and which one it dislikes.
CONCLUSION
The classification of the state as a market participant only partially
insulates the state. The United States Supreme Court has held a state
immune from dormant Commerce Clause examination when the state has
entered the market to buy or sell a proprietary interest. However, the
courts have established the limited utility of the market-participant classification by suggesting that the distinction does not protect the states
beyond the initial distribution of resources.
The crucial factor is whether the state is precluding commercial transactions between private individuals. If so, the courts are not as likely to
hold that the state is a market participant. If the state is not precluding
commercial transactions between private individuals, then arguably the
state may successfully control initial distribution of natural resources as
long as the state does not deny complete access to a resource over which
the state has a monopoly.
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